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ABSTRACT 
Pair-wise key establishment between neighboring nodes in wireless sensor networks 
is an essential security service since sensor networks are usually deployed in hostile 
environments and under various attacks. However, techniques that are used in general 
networks are unsuitable for sensor networks because of the resource constraints of the 
sensor nodes. Recently, key pre-distribution techniques have been proposed to establish 
pair-wise keys. However, since the network topology information is not available before 
deployment, it is difficult to decide which keys to preload to individual sensor node. 
Several types of schemes have been proposed to deal with this. problem. Probabilistic 
schemes randomly pick some keys from a large key pool to form a key ring for each 
node. Deterministic schemes construct the key ring of each node based. on some kind 
of rules (e.g. combinatorial design) . There are also some hybrid schemes that combine 
the probabilistic and deterministic designs. In this paper, we propose two novel schemes 
based on the combinatorial design. Detailed analytical and experimental results are 
given to compare the performance of the schemes discussed in this paper, which also 
indicate that our .schemes achieve a better key connectivity while still maintain a good 
resilience against node capture. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction and motivation 
Large-scale wireless sensor networks (WSN) are becoming more and more popular 
recently due to the advances in wireless communication and electronics [Akyildiz et al. 
(2002)] . Sensor networks can be used for a lot of applications, such as environmental 
observation, building safety monitoring, military sensing and tracking, health care, etc. 
Typical sensor nodes are low-cost, low-power and limited in storage, communication and 
computation capabilities. For example, a widely used research platform is Berkeley Mica 
Motes, which uses Atmel Atmega 128E processor (4MHZ) with 128KB on-board flash 
memory and 4K bytes SRAM [Berkeley (2002)] . The sensors have a radio range of 100 
feet and can communicate at a rate of 40Kbits/sec. They use 2AA batteries as power 
supply. Sensor networks typically consist of up to tens of thousands resource constrained 
sensors, which sense the local information and communicate with neighboring nodes to 
send data back to the base station. 
Since many sensor networks are deployed in unattended or hostile environments, they 
are prone to various kinds of attacks. Thus security services become critical in sensor 
networks. Basic _security services include key distribution and management. In a lot 
of applications, most communications are between a sensor and its immediate neigh-
bors. Therefore, we require each pair of neighboring nodes in a WSN to establish a 
pair-wise key for. secure communication. However, the properties of large scale WSN 
make the pair-wise key distribution and management problem much more challenging. 
It is infeasible to apply most of the traditional techniques that are widely used in general 
network environments. For example, one of the key management schemes is to use a key 
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distribution center (KDC) to distribute all the keys. This is not desirable for WSN be-
cause sensors are usually deployed in hostile environment and no trusted infrastructure 
is available. Besides, using KDC adds a lot of communication overhead to WSN, which 
is not desired because of the low power supply of sensor nodes. Another approach is to 
use public key cryptography. However, sensor nodes are low-power devices with limited 
computation capability, which makes it unsuitable for public key algorithms with high 
processing requirements. Therefore, the pre-distribution key management schemes are 
proposed, where keys are preloaded in the sensors before deployment. -These approaches 
eliminate the costly communication and computation required for distributing keys after 
sensors are deployed. But the random deployment pattern of WSN introduces other dif-
ficulties for the key pre-distribution schemes. Due to the hostile environment and large 
size of WSN, manual deployment of sensors is almost impossible in many applications. 
Sensors are usually randomly scattered from airplanes to the deployment areas. There-
fore, the exact position of a sensor is unknown before deployment, which implies that a 
sensor cannot know its neighborhood a priori. The unknown network topology makes it 
hard to decide which encryption keys to pre-load in each node before deployment. 
In this thesis, we propose two new key pre-distribution techniques based on a combi-
natorial design: Finite Projective Plane (FPP). The first one is based on the combination 
of the basic FPP-based scheme and the probabilistic scheme while the second one is to 
use two FPPs instead of one for the design. The motivations of our designs are to deal 
with the scalability problems of the basic FPP-based scheme and to improve resilience 
against node capture at the same time. However, there is no scheme that is suitable 
for all applications. Mathematical analysis and experimental results are provided to 
compare the performance of various schemes, including our proposed ones. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 gives a brief overview of 
the previous approaches proposed and introduces the background knowledge of combi-
natorial design and finite projective plane. chapter 3 first describes three existing key 
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pre-distribution schemes, including the random scheme [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)], 
FPP-based symmetric scheme [Camtepe and Yener (2004); Lee and Stinson (2005)], and 
the hybrid scheme [Camtepe and Yener (2004)]. Then we present our two new schemes: 
FPP-random hybrid scheme and FPP-based two-party scheme. Performance analysis 
of the five schemes is given in chapter 4, followed by the analytical. and experimental 
results. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and discusses potential future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. Related work and background 
2.1 Related work 
A number of key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed in the past several 
years to meet the security requirement of WSN. Most of them fall into three categories: 
probabilistic, deterministic, and hybrid schemes. 
2.1.1 Probabilistic schemes 
The basic probabilistic scheme was proposed in [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)] . In 
this scheme, each node is preloaded with a random set of keys from a large key pool. After 
deployment, two neighboring nodes that share a common key can establish a session key. 
However, for large key pools, the probability that two nodes share a common key is small. 
For small key pools, if one node is captured and all its keys are revealed, a lot of other 
communications are compromised as well because there are a lot of overlapping keys 
among the nodes. To improve the resilience against node capture, Chan et al. proposed 
the q-composite scheme [Chan et al. (2003)], which requires at least q keys in common 
for two neighboring nodes to establish a session key using these common. keys. Therefore, 
the keys used to encrypt messages are different from the original keys and when nodes 
are captured, less links are compromised. However, on the other hand, this scheme also 
decreases the key sharing probability and requires nodes to store more keys in order to 
establish pair-wise keys. 
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2.1.2 Deterministic schemes 
Several deterministic key pre-distribution schemes were proposed in [Camtepe and 
Yener (2004); Lee and Stinson (2005)] based on combinatorial design theory. The scheme 
proposed in [Camtepe and Yener (2004)] uses a symmetric design finite projective plane 
with parameters (n2 -I-n-I-1, n-I-1, 1) to support a WSN of size N = n 2--fin+l. According 
to the design, every node needs to store K = n + 1 keys and every pair of nodes have 
exactly one key in common. Therefore after deployment, every pair of neighboring- nodes 
can find a common key as their pair-wise key. Similar idea was also proposed in [Lee 
and Stinson (2005)]. 
2.1.3 Hybrid schemes 
Although the finite projective plane(FPP)-based symmetric scheme guarantees every 
pair of nodes to establish a key after deployment, it requires each node to store about 
keys, which is not very scalable as the network size N increases. In [Camtepe and 
Yener (2004)], the authors proposed a hybrid design of finite projective plane and its 
complementary design to address the limitations of the basic scheme. 
Another type of deterministic solutions is the polynomial based key pre-distribution 
scheme proposed in [Blundo et al. (1993)]. Unlike the previous solutions which directly 
store keys, this scheme stores a polynomial share f (u, y) of a symmetric t—degree poly-
nomial f (x, y) in a node with the ID u. After deployment, if node u needs to establish a 
pair-wise key with node v, it can evaluate its polynomial share f (u, y) at the point y = v 
and compute f (u, v). Similarly, node v calculates f (v, u). Since f (x, y) is symmetric, 
u and v can then use f (u, v) as their pair-wise key. This .scheme has the property that 
if no more than t nodes are captured (t is the degree of the polynomial), the network 
is secure. But if more than t nodes are captured, the whole network is compromised, 
where t is the degree of the polynomial. To further improve the resilience of the net-
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work, polynomial pool based schemes were proposed in [Liu and Ning (2003); Du et al. 
(2005)], which are combinations of the polynomial based scheme and the probabilistic 
scheme. To achieve good resilience, these schemes need to store more .keying materials 
(coefficients of polynomial shares), which may not be scalable for sensor nodes with 
limited storages. Besides, these schemes requires more computations than. the schemes 
that explicitly store keys. 
In some other work, deployment knowledge are also used to improve the performance 
of the key pre-distribution schemes [Du et al. (2004)]. They assume that the location of 
the nodes after deployment can be estimated. Therefore every node knows who is more 
likely to be its neighbors before deployment and the keys stored in the nodes are based 
on this deployment information. However, there are a lot of WSN applications in which 
the estimated locations of the nodes are not available. 
2.2 Combinatorial design and finite projective plane 
Informally, combinatorial design is defined as a way of selecting subsets from a finite 
set in such a way that some specified conditions are satisfied [Wallis (1988)]. The subsets 
selected from the universal set is called blocl~s. If there is no structural ordering or pattern 
in the blocks (blocks are only sets), this design is called a block design [Wallis (1988)]. 
Pre-distributing keys into sensor. nodes is similar to constructing a block design. The key 
pool can be mapped to a universal set of keys and the key rings are all blocks. Regular 
design is a widely studied class of block designs. A regular design has four parameters 
v, b, r, and 1~, where v is the number of elements in the universal set S and b is the 
number of blocks in the design. In a regular design, blocks have the same size k. In 
other words, each block is a k-subset of S. Besides, each element in S belongs to exactly 
r blocks [Wallis (1988)]. 
Definition 1 A (v, b, r,1~, ~~-balanced incomplete blocl~ design(BIBD) is a (v, b, r, ~)-
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regular design and each pair of elements occur together in exactly .~ of the blocks Wallis 
(1988); Anderson (1990)J. 
A (v, b, r, l~, ~)-BIBD has the following two properties. 
1. bk = vr, 
The two properties can be proved using the balanced properties of regular and BIBD 
design. 
Definition 2 A s~mmetrzc BIBD zs a (v, b, r,1~, a)-BIBD with r = ~ and v = b. 
Therefore, a (v, b, r, I~, ~}-symmetric BIBD can be written as (v,1~, a) . In such a 
symmetric BIBD, there are b = v blocks. Every element is in r = ~ blocks and every 
block contains ~ = r elements. Every pair of elements occurs in ~ blocks and every pair 
of blocks intersects ~ elements. 
Definition 3 A finite projective plane of order n is a (n2 -I- n -I- 1, n + 1,1)-symmetric 
BIBD, where n is a prime power. 
Finite projective plane(FPP) is a subset of symmetric BIBD. As we can see from the 
definition, in a FPP, the block size is roughly equal to the number of blocks. It is well 
known that FPP can be implemented using Mutually Orthogonal .Latin Squares(MOLS) [Wal-
lis (1988); Anderson (1990)] of finite field. Therefore, it is possible to apply FPP design 
to the key pre-distribution scheme. 
[Camtepe and Yener (2004)] introduces the idea of complementary design for the 
hybrid key pre-distribution scheme. For each block BZ, i = 1, • • • ,1~ in the block design 
D = (v,1~, ~), a complementary symmetric block Bi is constructed as S — Bi. The 
complementary design D of design D contains all the.. complementary blocks. D is also 
a symmetric design urith the parameters (v, v --1~, v -- 21~-~- ~) [Camtepe and Yener (2004) . 
For example, a finite projective plane with parameters (7, 3, 1) on the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} 
is .given as {1, ~2, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {3, 4, 6}, {4, 5, 7}, {5, 6,1}, {6, 7, 2}, and {7, 1, 3}. And 
the corresponding complementary design is {3, 5, 6, 7}, { 1, 4, 6, 7}, { 1, 2, 5, 7}, { 1, 2, 3, 6}, 
{2, 3, 4, 7}, {1, 3, 4, 5}, and {2, 4, 5, 6}. 
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CHAPTER 3. Combinatorial design-based key management 
schemes 
In this section, we present several key pre-distribution schemes that are based on 
finite projective plane (FPP) design. Since our schemes are related to the random key 
pre-distribution scheme proposed in [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)] and we will compare 
the performance of combinatorial design based schemes with it, we briefly introduce the 
random scheme first. 
3.1 Random key pre-distribution scheme 
The basic random key pre-distribution scheme is proposed in [Eschenauer and Gligor 
(2002)] . In the rest of the thesis, we refer to this scheme as the random scheme. In this 
scheme, all the keys stored in the nodes are randomly picked. from a key pool P. The 
random scheme ,includes three phases as follows: 
Key pre-distributzon: The scheme randomly generates a large number of distinct 
cryptographic keys, which forms a ~e~ pool P. Each sensor node randomly picks K keys 
from P and stores them in its memory. These K keys forms the node's ]~e~ rzng. 
DZrect establ2shment: After deployment, each node discovers its neighbors and whether 
it shares common keys with them. Node u's neighbors are all the nodes that are in u's 
communication radius. ~ can then use these common keys to communicate with same 
of its neighbors. In order to find out the direct keys, nodes can exchange IDs of the keys 
they have, or they can broadcast a list of challenges as mentioned in [Eschenauer and 
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Gligor (2002)] in order to secure the communication. 
Path I~e~ establishment: If two neighboring nodes do not share a common key in 
their key rings, they need to find a secure path to set up a key between them. A path 
is secure if every link on it has already established a communication key. Therefore one 
node can generate a path key and send it to the other node securely. 
The random scheme is easy to implement and its security performance is not bad. 
However, the key connectivity of the random scheme is usually not good. Key con 
nectivity is the probability that two neighboring nodes can establish a direct key after 
deployment. If the key pool is very large while the key ring is relatively small, the key 
connectivity is low because the probability that two nodes have common key is small. 
Lower key connectivity requires. more communication in the path key establishment 
phase and is also not very secure. 
On the other hand, if we decrease the key pool size or increase the key ring size, 
the key connectivity will be increased. However, more communication links will use the 
same keys and when one node is captured, more links are compromised as well. 
Most schemes proposed later also consist of these three phases. The dif.~erences 
among various schemes mostly lie in the key pre-distribution phase. For instance, the 
combinatorial design based schemes we propose in this thesis introduce structured key 
pool and key rings in the key pre-distribution phase to .improve the performance. 
3.2 Basic scheme: FPP-based symmetric scheme 
Finite projective plane has some nice symmetric properties, especially that every 
two blocks share exactly one key. A natural idea is to map the finite projective plane to 
the key pre-distribution scheme in the sensor network. The basic FPP-based symmetric 
scheme was proposed in [Camtepe and Yener (2004)]. 
Similar to the random scheme, the FPP-based symmetric scheme also begins with 
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the key pre-distribution phase. For a sensor network of N nodes, the key pre-distribution 
phase works as follows: 
1. Construct. a finite projective plane with parameters (n2 -I- n ~-1, n -I-1,1), where n 
is the smallest prime power such that n2 + n + 1 > N. Mutually Orthogonal Latin 
Squares(MOLS) can be used to implement finite projective planes [Camtepe and 
Yener (2004)]. 
2. Each element in the projective plane is associated with a distinct key. So the key 
pool contains n2 + n + 1(> N) keys. Key pool size P = n2 + n + 1. 
3. Each block is associated with a key ring of a distinct sensor node. Since there are 
n2 + n + 1(> N) blocks, there will be enough blocks for all the sensor nodes. 
4. The key ring size K of each node is equal to the block size ~ = n -}- 1. So given 
the network size N, we can. compute the key ring size K of each node. 
5. Since this is a finite projective plane, every pair of blocks intersects ~ = 1 elements, 
which means that every pair of sensor nodes shares exactly one key. 
After the nodes are deployed, they perform the direct key establishment phase. Note 
that the path key establishment is not necessary for this scheme since each pair of nodes 
can establish a key in the direct key establishment phase. 
FPP-based symmetric scheme is a deterministic scheme compared to the random 
scheme which is probabilistic. It solves the low key connectivity problem perfectly since 
every pair of nodes share exact one key which can be used to secure their link if they 
are neighbors. However, this scheme raises other problems. One essential one is the 
scalability problem. For a network of size nl -}- n1 -}- 1 ~ N C n2 -F- n2 -}- 1, where n~ 
and n2 are two adjacent prime power, the key ring size is I~ = n2 -I- 1 . For example, if 
the network size N = 10, 000, we need the key ring size to be at least 102 to use this 
scheme, while in random scheme, key ring size can be smaller. 
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3.3 FPP-complementary- hybrid scheme 
[Camtepe and Yener (2004)]. also proposed another more complex hybrid scheme 
to solve the scalability problem of the FPP-based symmetric scheme. We refer to this 
scheme as FPP-complementary h~brzd scheme. First a core design is generated using 
finite projective plane. Based on the core design, a complementary design is generated. 
For each key ring KZ in the core design, a complement block KZ = P — KZ is generated, 
where P is the key pool. If there are N sensor nodes and each can carry K keys, the key 
pre-distribution phase is performed as follows. First, find the largest prime power n such 
that n -}- 1 < K and generate the core symmetric design (n2 -}- n -}- 1, n -I-1,1) based on 
n. The key rings generated by the core symmetric design covers N' = n2 -I- n -{-1 sensor 
nodes. Then n -}-1 complement blocks are generated for each key ring in core design. For 
the other N —1V' nodes, randomly pick a K-subset HZ from the complementary blocks 
as its key ring. The direct and, path key establishment phases are similar to previous 
schemes. 
The FPP-complementary hybrid scheme solves the scalability problem of the FPP-
based symmetric scheme. Compared with the basic scheme, FPP-complementary hybrid 
scheme uses the same key pool size to support more sensor nodes. Obviously, more 
communication links use the same keys in this scheme. If some nodes are captured, 
many remaining links are compromised too. 
3.4 FPP-random hybrid scheme 
In order to solve the scalability problem of FPP-based symmetric scheme and to 
support larger network size, we propose FPP-random hybrid scheme, which combines 
the random scheme with the symmetric design to improve scalability. Different from the 
FPP-complementary hybrid scheme, the FPP-random scheme can use various key pool 
size for fixed network size and key ring size based on :different applications. The key 
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pre-distribution phase of this hybrid scheme works as follows: 
1. Given the maximum .key ring size K, find a the largest prime power n such that 
n<K. 
2. Randomly generate a key pool of size P, where P > n2 -(- n -}-1. 
3. Randomly pick N' = n2 -I- n -}- 1 keys from the key pool P and generate a finite 
projective plane (n2 -}- n -f -1, n -I- 1,1 } on these N' keys. This symmetric design is 
called the core design. 
4. Use the finite projective plane to support N' nodes in the network. For each of 
the other N — N' nodes, randomly pick K keys from the whole key pool as its key 
ring. 
Unlike the basic FPP-based symmetric design, the FPP-random hybrid design re-
quires the nodes to perform both direct key establishment and path key establishment 
after deployment because it sacrifices the 100°~o key connectivity in the basic design to 
improve the scalability. This scheme also improves the resilience against node capture 
since the key pool P can be larger than that of the basic scheme. In the direct key 
establishment phase, if two neighboring nodes' key rings are from the core design, they 
can establish a pairwise key for sure. Otherwise, they need to check whether they share 
a common key. If the two nodes do not share a common key, they need to start the path 
key establishment phase to obtain a communication key. The direct and path key estab-
lishment phases in the FPP-random hybrid scheme are similar to those in the random 
scheme. 
3.5 FPP-based two-party scheme 
Although the FPP-random scheme we proposed solves the scalability problem of 
the FPP-based symmetric scheme, it introduces new :.problems. When the network size 
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increases but the key ring size remains the same, more nodes choose their key rings 
randomly from the key pool. Therefore, the key connectivity of the scheme decreases 
and is close to that of the random scheme. To further improve the performance of 
FPP-random hybrid scheme, we present the idea of a new FPP-based two-.party key 
pre-distribution scheme. The idea is to improve the scalability while still maintain 
good key connectivity. This scheme also improves the resilience against node capture 
compared to the basic FPP-based symmetric scheme. 
3.5.1 Basic idea 
Similar to all the previously discussed schemes, our FPP-based two-party scheme 
also includes three phases:. key pre-distribution, direct key establishment, and path key 
establishment. However, the key pre-distribution phase is different from the FPP-based 
symmetric and FPP-random schemes. Instead of constructing only one finite projective 
plane on the key pool, we divide the whole key pool into two small ones and construct 
a finite projective plane on top of each of the small key pools separately. The two small 
key pools can have some overlapping keys so as to increase the key connectivity. The 
number of overlapping keys is an adjustable parameter based on different applications. 
In the key pre-distribution phase, N of the nodes are preloaded with key rings from the 
first finite projective plane, while the rest of them store the key rings from the second 
finite projective plane. The direct and path key establishment phases are similar to 
those in the random scheme. 
3.5.2 Detailed description 
3.5..2..1 Key pre-distribution 
In this phase, the ofuine key setup server construct the key rings for all the sensor 
nodes. For a sensor network of size N, the algorithm is as follows: 
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1. Find the smallest integer N' that is greater than 2  and also satisfy the following 
condition: N' = n2 -I- n -}- 1, while n is a prime power. 
2. Generate two random key pools Kl and K2i where ~Kl ~ = N' and ~K2 I = ~(1— A)1V~~, 
where 0 < p < 1, and p is called overlapping factor, which is used to denote the 
proportion of overlapping keys in the key pools. Randomly pick 1pN'~ keys from 
key pool Kl and distribute them in K2. Therefore (Kl ~ _ ~ K2 ~ = N'. 
3. Construct two finite projective planes P(Kl) and P(K2) on top of the key pools 
Kl and K2. 
4. For the first ~ 21 nodes, randomly pick a block from P(Kl) as its key ring. For 
the rest nodes, randomly pick a block from P(K2) as its key ring. 
5. The unused blocks are saved for the sensors that will join the network later. 
The overlapping factor p must be chosen carefully so as to achieve good key connec-
tivity while still maintain satisfactory resilience against node capture. 
3.5.2.2 Direct key establishment 
In the direct. key establish phase, each node discovers all its neighbors and whether 
it shares keys with them. Fora .pair of neighboring nodes, if their key rings are from 
the same finite projective plane, they can establish a direct key. Otherwise, there is a 
certain chance that they share one or more keys because the two key pools have some 
overlap. In order to establish direct keys, nodes can exchange the key IDs of the key 
rings, or they can broadcast a list of challenges as mentioned in [Eschenauer and Gligor 
(2002)] in order to secure the communication. 
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3.5.2.3 Path key establishment 
If two nodes have key rings from different finite projective planes, they have to go 
through path key establishment phase to set up an indirect key. They need to find a 
number of intermediate nodes to establish a secure communication path from the source 
to the destination. Then the source node can send a secret securely to the destination and 
they will use this secret as their communication key. In this scheme, we only consider 
paths of 2 links (only one intermediate node) in order to reduce the communication 
overhead. As we will see from the analysis, using only 2-hop paths we can get a very 
high key connectivity that is close to 100°0. 
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CHAPTER 4. Performance evaluation 
In this section, we give performance analysis for the two new schemes we proposed 
based on five performance metrics. We also include the analytical results for the three 
existing schemes. Besides analyzing the schemes individually, we also provide the per-
formance comparison of the five schemes. 
4.1 Performance metrics 
To analyze and compare the performance of the key management schemes, we adopt 
the following criteria. 
Key connectivity Key connectivity is the probability that two neighboring nodes 
can establish a communication key. We consider 1-hop and 2-hop connectivity in our 
analysis. 1-hop connectivity is defined as the probability that two neighboring nodes 
share a common key after the direct key establishment phase. 2-hop connectivity refers 
to the probability that two neighboring nodes share a key after the path key establish-
ment phase. We assume that only 2-hop paths are established and used to send the 
communication key. 
S calability ..Usually when the network size grows, with the same key ring size, 
the 1-hop key connectivity decreases. Therefore it is essential to support large network 
while still hold the key connectivity requirements. One way is to increase the key ring 
size so that each node store more keys. However, since sensors are limited in memory 
resources, there is a tradeoff between the scalability and the storage complexity. This 
s 
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problem can be considered from two aspects. For a certain scheme, we would like to 
know the maximum supported network size given a fixed key ring size and the minimum 
key ring size given a fixed network size. 
Resilience against node capture The resilience against node capture is an es-
sential performance metric for key pre-distribution schemes. Since most sensor networks 
are deployed in hostile environments in an unattended fashion, the sensor nodes can be 
easily captured physically by the adversary. Thus all the keys stored in the captured 
nodes are revealed. Since some of the remaining links may use these keys to commu-
nicate, they are compromised as well. If the scheme is not resilient, even if only few 
nodes are captured, a large proportion of the network is compromised. We evaluate the 
resilience against node capture by estimating the fraction of remaining links that are 
also compromised when x nodes are captured. 
Communication overhead Because of the limited bandwidth and power of sensor 
nodes, low communication overhead is desired for the key pre-distribution schemes. We 
evaluate communication overhead by the number and size of messages sent and received 
by a sensor node during both direct and path key establishment phases. 
Computational complexity Since the sensor nodes have very low computation 
capability, low computational complexity is required for the key pre-distribution schemes. 
Computational complexity is analyzed in terms of the number of unit functions executed. 
Unit functions are functions such as Search, Hash, MAC, VecMul(size), PolyEval(count), 
etc [Camtepe and Yener (2005)]. 
4.2 Analytical result 
4.2.1 Key connectivity 
In this section, we analyze the key connectivity of the five schemes we discussed in 
the previous section. Two types of connectivity are considered: 1-hop connectivity Cl 
19 
and 2-hop connectivity C2, which are defined as follows: 
• 1-hop connectivity Cl -the probability that two neighboring nodes are able to find 
a common key after the direct key establishment phase. 
• 2-hop connectivity C2 -the probability that two neighboring nodes are able to find 
a common key after the path key establishment phase. We define the probability 
as the 2-hop connectivity since we only consider 2-hop paths in the path key 
establishment phase. 
4.2.1.1 Random scheme 
1-hop connectivity: 1-hop connectivity is given in [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)] . 
It can be calculated as: Cl = 1 ~pP 2K)!P! ' 
.2-hop connectivity: If two neighboring nodes u and v do not share a key after the 
direct key establishment phase, they need to find a common neighbor w to establish a 
path key, where u and w must share a key and so as v and w. 
The 2-hop connectivity is given in [Chan et al. (2003)] : C2 = Cl -I- (1 — Cl ) (1 — (1 — 
Ci )0.5865n') ~ where n' is the expected number of neighbors of each node and c = 0.5865n' 
is the number of nodes that are in both u and v's communication ranges [Chan et al. 
(2003)]. 
4.2.1.2 FPP-based symmetric scheme 
Using the FPP-based symmetric scheme, every pair of nodes have exact one key in 
common. So every pair of nodes can communicate with each other after the direct key 
establishment phase. Therefore we have Cl = C2 = 1. 
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4.2.1.3 FPP-complementary scheme 
1-hop connectivity: A detailed analysis on the 1-hop connectivity is given in [Camtepe 
and Yener (2004)]. 
~-hop connectivity: The 2-hop connectivity C2 can be calculated using the 1-hop 
connectivity Cl similar to that for the random scheme: C2 = Cl -~ (1 — Cl ) (1 — (1 — 
cl) 
0.5865n' ) 
4.2.1.4 FPP-random scheme 
1-hop connectivity: There are three types of neighboring node pairs (u, v): 
• BB(u, v): Both nodes' key rings are from the core design. 
• BR(u, v): One node's key ring is from the core design and the other's is from 
random part. 
• RR(u, v): both nodes' key rings are from random part. 
If we use C(u, v) to denote that u and v share at least one key, the 1-hop key probability 
Cl is: Cl = P(C) = P(C~BB)P(BB) ~ P(C~BR)P(BR) -f- P(C~RR)P(RR). 
Since the core design can support N' = n2 -I- n -F-1 out of N nodes in the network and 
the random part supports N — N' nodes, P(BB), P(BR) and P(RR) can be calculated 
as follows. 
N'(N' — 1) 
P(BB) _ 
N(N — 1) ' 
2N'(N — N') 
(N—N')(N—N'-1) 
P(RR) _ 
N(N — 1) 
Since the core design uses finite projective plane, the probability that the two nodes 
sharing a common key is 1, therefore P(C~BB) = 1. As we have discussed for the 
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random scheme, P(C~RR) = 1 ((PP 2K~;P2, [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)]. So we only 
need to calculate P(C~BR). For two neighboring nodes u and v, assume that u's key 
ring is from the core design and v's key ring is from the random part. The probability 
that v does not share any key with u is ((P-K);)2, . Thus P(C~BR) = 1 (P-2K).P. 
Therefore, Cl = P(C 
((P-K)!)2
(P-2K)!P! 
BB)P(BB) + P(C BR)P(BR) + P(C RR)P(RR) = Niv(N` lj) + 
(1 
((P-K)!)2) 
X (N-N')(N+N'-1) . (P-2K)!P! N(N-1) 
~-hop connectivity: As we have discussed in the random scheme, the 2-hop connec-
tivity can be calculated based on the 1-hop connectivity as follows: C2 = Cl + (1 —
Cl) (1 — (1 — Ci) 0.5865n' ) 
4.2.1.5 FPP-based two-party scheme 
1-hop connectivity: We use a different method to calculate the 1-hop connectivity 
for FPP-based two-party scheme. The probability that two neighboring nodes share a 
common key is equal to the probability that two arbitrary nodes share a key since all 
the nodes are deployed randomly. Therefore, the probability can be calculated as the 
fraction of node pairs that share a common key. Since there are N = 2N' nodes in 
the network, there are (2) = N( 2-1) = N'(2N' — 1) pairs of nodes. For any two nodes 
u and v, if their key rings are from the same key pool, they always share exactly one 
key due to the construction of the finite projective plane. The number of node pairs is 
2(2~) = N'(N' — 1) in this case. We now consider the case that u and v have key rings 
from different key pools. Since pN' keys are shared by the two key pools (overlapping 
keys) and every node carries K keys, the expected number of overlapping keys in each 
node is N,~ K = pK. We first consider a node u whose key ring is from key pool P(Kl ). 
u has pK overlapping keys. Since all the overlapping keys are at the same position in 
both key pools, there must exists another node v, whose key ring is from P(K2), carries 
the same shared keys as u. Due to the construction of the finite projective plane, for each 
overlapping key in v, exactly n = K — 1 nodes from P(K2) also carry this key. Thus 
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pKn nodes from P(K2) carry one common overlapping key with node v. Therefore, 
pKn + 1 nodes in P(K2), including v, share common keys with u from P(Kl). Since 
N' nodes have key rings from P(Kl), the expected number of node pairs (u, v) with 
u's key ring from P(Kl), v's key ring from P(K2), and u, v share a common key is 
(pKn ~- 1)N'. Therefore, the total expected number of node pairs that share common 
keys can be calculated as N'(N' — 1) -~ (pKn -~ 1)N'. So the probability of two nodes 
share a common key is Cl = N'(N'Nl( ~pK j -I-1)N' _ N' 2Nn 11)n' j,~,ith N' = n2 -~ n -I- 1. 
~-hop connectivity: We use L(u, v) to denote that u and v can find a bridge w to 
set up a 2-hop secure path. Therefore the 2-hop connectivity C2 = P(C) ~- P(L n ~C) _ 
So we need to calculate P(L~, C), which is the probability that u and v can set up 
a 2-hop secure path given that they do not share a common key. Consider a common 
neighbor w of nodes u and v. w's key ring must from the same FPP as u or v. WLOG, 
we assume w and u are from the same FPP P(Kl ) . Thus w and v are from different 
FPPs. From the analysis for the 1-hop connectivity, we know that the probability that 
w and v share a key is given by pKly+1, which is also the probability that u and v can 
use w as an intermediate node to securely establish a key. 
We use c to denote the number of common neighbors of u and v. u and v can 
establish a 2-hop secure path if and only if at least one of these c nodes share common 
keys with both u and v. Thus, the probability that u and v can establish a 2-hop secure 
path if they do not share any common key is given by: P(L 
Since the expected number of common neighbors c is 0.5865n', where n' is the ex-
pected number of neighbors of one node [Chan et al. (2003)], we have P(L ~C) _ 
1 _ (1 
_ pKn+l) ~ = 1 _ (1 pKn-~1) 0.5865n' 
N' N' 
(il + (1 — C1) (1 — (1 
pK~~ {-1) 0.5865n' ) 
And the 2-hop connectivity is C2 = 
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4.2.2 Scalability 
4.2.2.1 Random scheme 
According to the description of the random scheme, an arbitrary key ring size K can 
support sensor networks of any size. However, to maintain the global connectivity P~ of 
the network, there are some restrictions on the relationship of network size N, key pool 
size P, and key ring size K [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)]. Global connectivity P~ is 
defined as the probability that the whole network is connected [Eschenauer and Gligor 
(2002)]. For example, P~ = 0.999 means that 99.9°0 of the nodes share common keys 
with some of their neighbors. 
From the analysis in [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)], given the network size N, 
the expected number of neighbors of each node n', and the desired P~, we can find 
the required 1-hop probability p, which is the required 1-hop probability for the whole 
network to be connected with the probability P~. 
On the other hand, according to the previous discussion on 1-hop connectivity, the 
actual probability that two neighboring nodes share a key can be calculated asp = 
1 (PP 2K~;P2, . Therefore given the key pool size P, we can calculate the key ring size K 
that is required to get the required 1-hop connectivity p. Similarly, given the key ring 
size K, we also can get the key pool size P. Moreover, given the key ring size K and the 
key pool size P, we can get the 1-hop connectivity p. If we know the expected number 
of neighbors and the desired global connectivity P~, we are able to get the maximum 
supported network size N. 
4.2.2.2 FPP~based symmetric scheme 
For a given sensor network size N, we can find the smallest prime power n such that 
n2 -I - n ~- 1 > N. To use the FPP-based symmetric scheme, we require every node to 
support a key ring size K > n -}- 1. In opposite, if the key ring size of each node is given 
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as K, we can find out the maximum supported network size using this scheme. We first 
find out the maximum prime power n such that n -I-1 ~ K and the maximum supported 
network size is N = n2 -I- n -I- 1. 
4.2.2.3 FPP-complementary scheme 
The scalability of this scheme is discussed in [Camtepe and Yener (2004)]. Given the 
key ring size K = n -}- 1, the FPP-complementary design can support network sizes up 
t0 (n2-!-n+1 n+l I ' 
4.2.2.4 FPP-random hybrid scheme 
Using the FPP-random hybrid scheme, except the nodes that are supported by the 
core design, all the other nodes can randomly pick K keys to form their key rings. 
Therefore, given a key ring size K, the FPP-random hybrid scheme is able to support 
networks of any size. However, it has the similar problem as the random scheme. Since 
part of the network is supported by the random scheme, the 1-hop key connectivity 
must be high enough to achieve desired global network connectivity P~. Using the 
formula given in [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)], we can calculate the desired 1-hop key 
connectivity Cld given the network size N, the expected number of neighbors n', and 
the desired global network connectivity P~ [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)] . Meanwhile, 
following the analysis in the key connectivity section, we know that the real 1-hop 
COnnectlVlty is Cl r = N(N/ 1)) + (1 (PP 2K)!P!) X 
(N 
N(N 1N 1) ~ Therefore we require 
Clr > Cld to achieve the desired global network connectivity. Since N' = n2 -I- n ~-1 and 
K = n -I- 1, given n and P, we can calculate the maximum supported network size N by 
solving the inequality Cl,- > Cld. For this scheme, n is restricted to only prime powers. 
Also, given P and N, we are able to get n, and hence the key ring size K, based on the 
same inequality. 
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4.2.2.5 FPP-based two-party scheme 
Let N be the network size. Using the FPP-based two-party scheme, we need to 
construct two finite projective planes P(Kl) and P(KZ). Each FPP includes N' points, 
where N' = n2 ~ n ~- 1 ~ 2 and n is a prime power. Each block in the FPP includes 
K = n -I- 1 points. Therefore each node in the network needs to carry at least K = 
n ~- 1 ~ 2  3-1 keys. 
Similarly, given a key ring of size K, we can calculate the maximum supported net-
work size N. First we find out the largest prime power n < K —1 and use n as the FPP 
parameter. Thus the number of points in one FPP will be N' = n2 -~ n -I-1 and the total 
number of sensor nodes that the scheme can support is N = 2N'. 
4.2.3 Resilience against node capture 
The network resilience against node capture is defined as the fraction of links in the 
remaining network that are compromised if x nodes are captured. A remaining link is 
compromised if its communication key is in the key ring of a captured node. In real 
scenarios, links are related to the communication range and only exist between neigh-
boring nodes. However, the communication range does not affect the resilience against 
node capture since we assume that all the nodes are randomly deployed and have same 
communication range. Therefore, in our analysis, we assume that the communication 
range is large enough and every common key of each pair of sensor nodes is a link. We 
first consider the case that only one node c is captured. For each key I~ in c's key ring, 
we calculate the expected number of node pairs in the remaining network that have the 
common key 1~. Thus if we know the expected total number of remaining links in the 
network, we are able to calculate Pone ~ the expected resilience against node capture when 
one node is captured. Now if x nodes are captured, the expected resilience against node 
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capture can be estimated as Pr .; 1 — (1 — Pone)x. In this section, detailed analysis for 
Pone is given for every scheme. 
4.2.3.1 Random scheme 
Using the random scheme, every node randomly picks K keys from the key pool as 
its key ring. For every key 1~ in the key pool, the expected number of nodes that have 
1~ in their key rings are P~' . Therefore, the number of node pairs that share key ~ is 
n~ _ (2P ) . Since there are P keys in the key pool, the expected total number of links 
is Pn~. If one node c is captured, K keys are compromised and the expected number 
of links that are compromised is Kn~ . The node c itself is involved in K ( KP — 1) links. 
Therefore, the resilience against node capture when c is compromised can be calculated 
_ Knk -K(KP -1) __ KN-2P aS Pone — Pnk_K(xP _1) PN-2P ' 
4.2.3.2 FPP-based symmetric scheme 
The FPP-based symmetric scheme guarantees that every two nodes share exact one 
key. Therefore, the total number of links is ~'( 2-1) , N = n2 -{- n -f- 1. Besides, using the 
FPP-based symmetric scheme, every key is in exact K = n ~-1 key rings. Thus for every 
key 1~ of the captured node c, K( 2-1) links use ~ as their communication key. Among 




4.2.3.3 FPP-complementary scheme 
Using FPP-complementary scheme, N' nodes use blocks from the core design as their 
key rings and the other N — N' nodes randomly pick their key rings from the I~-subsets 
of complementary blocks. We use `class 1' and `class 2' to denote these two types of 
nodes. For every key ~ in the key pool, K = n -}-1 class 1 nodes have I~ in their key rings. 
And N' — K = n2 complementary blocks also have 1~. Since the N — N' class 2 nodes 
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randomly pick K-subsets of the complementary blocks as their key rings, the probability 
n2-1 
that 1~ is in the key ring of some class 2 node is (n2 ) X n2+n+l — n +n+l ~ Therefore, the 
(n~-1) 
expected number of class 2 nodes that have ~ is given by n + +l (N — N') = 
K( N,N~) and 
the expected total number of nodes that have ~ is K( N, N') ~- K = Nl;' . Therefore, the 
expected number of links using key 1~ is n~ _ (2N ) . Since there are N' keys in the key 
pool, the expected total number of links is N`n~. For the captured node c, the expected 
number of links that use keys from c's key ring is Kn~. And K(K ~- K( N,N~) 1) 
links involve node c. Thus the resilience against node capture when c is captured is 
Kn~—K(K-I-K( 
N, N') 1) __ KN-2N' 
N~n~—K( N 1;' —1) NON-2N' Pone = 
4.2.3.4 FPP-random hybrid scheme 
For the FPP-random hybrid scheme, N' keys are randomly selected from the key 
pool to construct the core design. Due to the construction, these keys are associated 
with more links than the remaining P — N' keys. There are also two classes of nodes 
using this scheme. We also use `class 1' and `class 2' to distinguish between them. The 
key rings of class 1 nodes are from the core design while the key rings of class 2 nodes are 
randomly picked from the whole key pool. For any key belonging to the core design, the 
expected number of nodes that have this key is K ~ K( P N~) , and the expected number 
K+ K( ~ N~) 
of links that associate with this key is nil = ( 2 ) . For any key that is not in 
the core design, the expected number of nodes that have the key is K( P 
N~) , and the 
K(N-N~) 
expected number of links that use this key is n~2 = ( 2 ) . Therefore, the expected 
total number of links is N'n~,l -I- (P — N')n~2 . 
If one node c is captured, it can either be a class 1 node or a class 2 node. If node c is 
a class 1 node, all its K keys belong to the core design. Therefore, the expected number 
of links that use keys from c's key ring is Kn~l . Among them, K(K -4- x( P 
N~) 1)
links involve the node c. Therefore, the fraction of compromised links in the remaining 
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Knkl -K(K-I- K( P N') 1) network when c is captured can be estimated as Ponel — K N-N N'n~l -I-(P-N')nk2 -K(K-I--  ( P ~) 1) 
If node c is from class 2, NP of its keys are from core design and the expected number 
of links whose communication keys are from c's key ring is P (N'n~l ~-- (P — N')n~2 ). And 
among them, P  K(K ~ 
K( ~ N') 
1) 
+ p ~ ' K( K( ~ N') 1) = K(KP -P)  links involve 
c. Therefore, the fraction of compromised links in the remaining network when c is 
K i i K(KN- P) 
— P (N nkl -I-(P-N )n k2) Pcaptured can be estimated as Pone2 — N'n~l -I--(P-N')n~2 K(Kp -P) 
Since there are N' class 1 nodes and N — N' class 2 nodes, the resilience against node 
capture when one node is captured is Pone — N/ Ponel + N N ' Pone2 
4.2.3.5 FPP-based two-party scheme 
Since two key pools P(Kl) and P(K2) are used for the FPP-based two-party scheme 
and they may overlap, the overlapping keys are associated with more links than the 
keys that belong to only one key pool. For any link in the network, if the two nodes of 
the link have key rings from different key pools, it must use an overlapping key. As we 
have analyzed in the key connectivity section, the expected number of such links in the 
network is (pKn -}- 1)N' . If the two nodes are from different key pools, there must be 
a link between them and the total number of such links is N'(N' — 1). Therefore, the 
total expected number of links in the network is (pKn -I- 1)N' -I- N'(N' — 1). 
Now we only need to calculate the number of links that use overlapping keys with 
both nodes' key rings from the same key pool. As we have discussed, the expected 
number of overlapping keys in each node is pK. For each overlapping key in node u, 
there are n = K — 1 nodes that share this key with u and their key rings are from 
the same key pool as node u. Since there are N' keys in a key pool, for the N' nodes 
that have key rings from the same key pool, PK2N' links use an overlapping key as their 
common key. Therefore, the total expected number of links that share overlapping keys 
is given by (pKn ~- 1) N' -{- PK2 N' x 2 = (2 pKn ~ 1) N' . And the expected number of 
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links that share non-overlapping keys is N' (N' —pKn — 1) . 
If a node c is captured, among its K keys, the expected number of overlapping keys 
are pK. Therefore, the number of links that associate with keys in c's key ring can be cal-
culated as N  (2pKn-~1)N'- }- 2N' pN ~N'(N' — pKn - 1) = 
K(3pKn-p2~nP (1-p)N'-I-1) Anlong 
these links, pK (2K —1) ~- (1— p) K (K —1) = Kn -{- pK2 links involve c. Therefore, the re-
silience against node capture when c is compromised is Po,,,e = 
_  (2p- p2-~1)n3-I-(3p- p2)n2-I-(PZ-p)n-I-(p2-4p-I-3) 
(P-p2-{-2)n4-I-(2p-2p2-I-4)n3-I-(4-pz)n2-I-(2-3p-I-p2)n+(p2-3p-I-2) . 
4.2.4 Communication overhead 
K(3pKn-p2Kn-{-(1-p)N~-I-1) (Kn-~pK2) 2-P
(pKn-I-1)N~~-N'(N~-1)-(Kn-~pK2) 
Since algorithms of direct and path key establishment phases are similar for all the 
schemes, here we give a brief analysis for all of them. During the direct key establishment 
phase, each innocent node needs to broadcast 1 message to its n' neighbors. Each 
message includes the key IDs of all the keys in the node's key ring. Suppose one key ID 
has d bits, the message length is dK bits since there are K keys in each node's key ring. 
Each node also receives n' messages from its neighbors, each contains dK bits. 
During the path key establishment phase, each innocent node unicasts 1 message 
to the neighbors with whom it shares a direct key. The expected number of messages 
sent is n'Cl , where n' is the expected number of neighbors and Cl is 1-hop connectivity. 
The message includes the key ID of both source and destination nodes. Meanwhile, 
each node receives n'Cl messages from its connected neighbors. After checking its own 
key ring, a node replies with a message to each request indicating whether it shares a 
common key with the destination node. So there are 2n'Cl messages sent and 2n'Cl
messages received in total. The messages are very short. Therefore the communication 
overhead is dependent on the 1-hop connectivity. If 1-hop connectivity is high, less 
communication is required in the path key establishment phase. For instance, for the 
FPP-based symmetric scheme, there is no message sent or received in the third phase, 
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since every pair of nodes can establish a direct key. 
4.2.5 Computational complexity 
For all these schemes, sensor nodes do not need to perform much computation. All 
the computation in the key pre-distribution phase is done offiine. Most computational 
complexity is generated by functions like `search' in both direct and path key establish-
ment phases. Every time a node needs to check whether it has a common key with some 
other node, it has to perform a `search' in its own key ring. For all the five schemes, 
during the direct key establishment phase, each node must perform n' `searches' for it 
n' neighbors. However, in the path key establishment phase, a node performs a `search' 
only when it is chosen by another two nodes to establish a path key between them. Also, 
in this phase, all the messages sent and received are encrypted and decrypted, which 
also contribute to the computational complexity. Therefore, less communication in the 
path key establishment phase means less computation is required for the sensor nodes. 
In other words, the computational complexity is also dependent on 1-hop connectiv-
ity. An effective method to reduce the computational complexity is to increase 1-hop 
connectivity. 
4.3 Performance analysis 
4.3.1 Comparison of schemes 
Since applications vary from one to another, there is no one-size-fits-all key pre-
distribution scheme for sensor networks. For instance, some applications have more 
concerns on the resilience performance while some others may focus on the scalability 
problem. By comparing the schemes, we are able to see the advantages and disadvantages 
of every scheme, which allows us to choose tradeoffs and to apply the most suitable 
scheme to different applications. In this section, we compare the above five key pre-
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distribution schemes on the performance of key connectivity, resilience against node 
capture, and scalability. 
4.3.1.1 Key connectivity 
Key connectivity is considered as the probability that two neighboring nodes are able 
to establish apair-wise key after deployment. Good key pre-distribution schemes must 
have high 1-hop key connectivity to save communication in the path key establishment 
phase. Besides, 2-hop key connectivity needs to be close to 1 since it is desired that 
every pair of neighboring nodes can be connected by at most 2-hop after the path key 
establishment phases. 
The FPP-based symmetric scheme guarantees that two neighboring nodes can estab- 
lish acommunication key after the direct key establishment phase. The communication 
and computation overhead in path key establishment phase is avoided using this scheme. 
Therefore, FPP-based symmetric scheme has the best key connectivity among the five 
schemes. For the rest four schemes, we calculate both the 1-hop and 2-hop connectivity 
based on the same network size and key ring size. Based on the same network size 
N = 10, 000 and key ring -size K = 72, the analytical results of 1-hop and 2-hop con-
nectivity for the four schemes are given in the 4.1. l~Tote that for FPP-complementary 
scheme, the key pool size is P = n2 + n -}- 1 = 5113; for FPP-based two-party scheme, 
if the overlapping factor p = 0.2, the key pool size is P = (2 — 0.2)(n2 -}- n -{- 1) = 9203. 
If p = 1, P = 5113. In this case, the two finite projective planes are identical and the 
1-hop connectivity is 1. For random and FPP-random scheme, the key pool size can be 
of any size. 
From table 4.1 we are able to conclude that the random scheme has the poorest 
1-hop connectivity among the five schemes with the same network size, key ring size 
and key pool size. Compared to the random scheme and the FPP-random schemes, the 
FPP-based two-party scheme has the best 1-hop connectivity. As the overlapping factor 
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Scheme 1-hop connectivity 2-hop connectivity 
Random (P = 9203) 0.4332 0.9854 
Random (P = 5113) 0.6424 0.9999 
FPP-based symmetric 
(P = 5113) 1 1 
FPP-random (P = 9203) 0.5846 0.9997 
FPP-random (P = 5113) 0.7396 0.9999 
FPP-complementary 
(P = 5113) 0.7523-0.9883 0.9999 
FPP-based two-party 
(P = 9203) 0.6 0.9921 
FPP-based two-party 
(P = 5113) 1 1 
Table 4.1 Key connectivity (N = 10,000, K = 72) 
p increases, the number of overlapping keys also increases and the 1-hop connectivity 
becomes higher. However, when there are more overlapping keys, the network becomes 
more vulnerable since the resilience against node capture becomes worse. So we need to 
choose the overlapping factor carefully based on different applications. 
4.3.1.2 Resilience against node capture 
For the security concern, we prefer the resilience against node capture, which is the 
fraction of remaining links compromised, to be as low as possible when some nodes are 
captured. It is obvious that the fraction decreases when the key pool size P increases 
and key ring size K decreases. However, there are tradeoffs between resilience and key 
connectivity since key connectivity is lower with larger key pool and/or smaller key ring. 
Consider the example we have used to compare the key connectivity. The network size 
is N = 10, 000 and key ring size is K = 72. The resilience against node capture is given 
in table 4.2. 
From table 4.2, we can see that with the same key ring size and key pool size, the 
random scheme achieves the best resilience against node capture, followed by the FPP-
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Scheme 50 captured 200 captured 
Random (P = 9203) 0.3179 0.7836 
Random (P = 5113) 0.5029 0.9389 
FPP-based Symmetric 
(P = 5113,N = 5113) 0.4982 0.9366 
FPP-random(P = 9203) 0.4012 0.8714 
FPP-random (P = 5113) 0.5030 0.9390 
FPP-complementary(P = 5113) 0.5030 0.9390 
FPP-based two-party(P = 9203} 0.3552 0.8272 
FPP-based two-party(P = 5113) 0.5031 0.9390 
Table 4.2 Resilience against node capture (N = 10,000, K = 72) 
based two-party scheme and the FPP-random scheme. The FPP-complementary scheme 
has a worse resilience than the FPP-random scheme since its key pool size is fixed with 
certain key ring size while the FPP-random scheme is able to use larger key pools and 
hence to achieve better resilience. With a key ring size of 72, the FPP-based symmetric 
scheme can only support a network of size 5113 and the resilience against node capture 
is close to that of the FPP-complementary scheme. To support a network of size 10,000 
using the FPP-based symmetric scheme, some nodes must have the same key ring, which 
will make the resilience against node capture much worse. 
Although with the same key ring size and key pool size, the random scheme out-
performs the FPP-based two-party and the FPP-random scheme on resilience against 
node capture, it is not the same case when we take key connectivity into consideration. 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the resilience against node capture for 10,000 nodes with same 
key ring size and expected 1-hop key connectivity but different key pool sizes for the 
five schemes. 
For the FPP-based symmetric and the FPP-complementary scheme, once the key 
ring size and network size are fixed, the expected 1-hop key connectivity is also fixed. 
Therefore, we cannot compare the resilience of them with the other three schemes di-
rectly. For the remaining three schemes, with the same expected 1-hop key connectivity, 
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Scheme 50 captured 200 captured 
Random (P = 5730) 0.4633 0.917 
*FPP-based Symmetric 
(P = 5113, N = 5113, Cl = 1) 0.4982 0.9366 
FPP-random (P = 8644) 0.4097 0.8786 
*FPP-complementary 
(P = 5113, Cl: 0.7523-0.9883) 0.5030 0.9390 
FPP-based two-party (P = 9203) 0.3552 0.8272 
Table 4.3 Resilience against node capture (N = 10,000, K = 72, Cl = 0.6) 
the FPP-based two-party scheme achieves the best resilience against node capture, fol-
lowed by the FPP-random scheme, while the random scheme has the worst resilience. 
4.3.1.3 Scalability 
Scalability of different schemes is compared based on the maximum supported net-
work size using the same key ring size. From the discussion in section 4.2.2, with a 
fixed key ring size, both the random scheme and the FPP-random scheme can support a 
network of any size. However, to support same number of sensor nodes and achieve same 
1-hop key connectivity, the FPP-random scheme uses a larger key pool than the random 
scheme, which implies better resilience against node capture. For example, with key ring 
size 72, to support a network of 10,000 nodes and to achieve a 1-hop key connectivity 
of 0.6, the resilience against node capture is 0.71 using the FPP-random scheme, which 
is better than 0.67 when using the random scheme. For the other three schemes, the 
maximum network sizes are related to key ring size. From our discussion in section 4.2.2, 
the FPP-complementary scheme has better scalability than the FPP-based two-party 
scheme and the FPP-based symmetric scheme has the worst scalability. 
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4.3.2 Experimental results 
4.3.2.1 Experimental settings: 
To evaluate the schemes we have discussed and to verify our analytical result, we use 
the following configurations for experiments. We assume that there are 10, 000 sensors 
in total in the deployment area, each with communication radius of lOm. The expected 
number of each sensor node is 30. We designed three experiments to test the affect of 
different parameters on the key connectivity and resilience against node capture of our 
proposed schemes. 
• Experiment I: In this experiment, we focus on the 1-hop key connectivity when key 
pool size varies. We fix the network size to be 10,000 nodes and key ring size to 
be 72. Since key pool size is related to the overlapping factor p in our FPP-based 
two-party scheme, we use the change in overlapping factor to represent the change 
in key pool size. In this experiment, we run our simulations when the overlapping 
factor varies from 0.2 to 1. We test three different schemes using various key pool 
size: the random scheme, the FPP-based random scheme, and the FPP-based two-
party scheme, because for the FPP-based symmetric and the FPP-complementary 
schemes, key pool size is fixed if key ring size is fixed. 
• Experiment II: The second experiment is about the resilience against node capture 
when key pool size varies. Total number of nodes is set to be 10,000, key ring size 
is also fixed to be 72 and the number of node captured is set to be 50. 
• Experiment III: We test the resilience against node capture with various number 
of captured nodes. The experiment is also performed on 10,000 nodes, with key 
ring size 72 and key pool size 9203 (overlapping factor p = 0.2). The number of 
node captured varies from 50 to 200. 
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Besides, two more experiments are performed to evaluate the performance of our 
proposed schemes with different network sizes. 
• Experiment IV: We change the network size from 2,000 to 10,000 nodes in this 
experiment. Therefore, the corresponding minimum key ring size changes from 38 
to 72. This experiment evaluates the 1-hop connectivity in networks of different 
sizes. For all three schemes, we use the key pool of the FPP-based two-party 
scheme in this experiment. Therefore, the change of key pool size with different 
network size is related to the key ring size. We use overlapping factor p = 0.4 in 
this experiment. 
• Experiment V: Although for a fixed network size, we are able to find a minimum 
key ring size, we are also interested in the performance of our schemes when larger 
key ring sizes are applied. In other words, we want to test whether larger key 
ring size can improve the 1-hop connectivity and resilience against node capture. 
Therefore, in this experiment, we use a key ring size of 72 (which is the minimum 
key ring size for 10,000 nodes in our two-party scheme) with different network sizes 
from 1,000 to 10,000 to evaluate our schemes. The key pool size is 9203 and other 
parameters are the same as described in previous experiments. 
4.3.2.2 Experiment results: 
As we have discussed, the key pool size P has significant effect on the performance 
of key connectivity and resilience against node capture. Figure 4.1 shows the 1-hop key 
connectivity with different key pool sizes (P = (2 — p) (n2 + n + 1) and p = 0.1, 0.2, • • • , 1) 
for the random scheme, the FPP-random scheme, and the FPP-based two-party scheme. 
The FPP-based symmetric scheme and the FPP-complementary scheme are not included 
because these two schemes require fixed key pool size for the above settings. 
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Note that the 1-hop connectivity increases as the key pool size decreases (overlapping 
factor p increases). Compared to the random scheme, the two FPP-based schemes have 
improved the 1-hop key connectivity greatly because they use the symmetric design 
which guarantees some overlap among the key rings of sensor nodes. The FPP-based 
two-party scheme is even better since all the key rings are under the symmetric design 
while for the FPP-random scheme, some of the key rings are still randomly selected. 
For the extreme case, where p = 1, the FPP-based two-party scheme consists of two 
identical finite projective planes. In this case, the two-party scheme can be compared to 
the FPP-based complementary scheme since they have the same key pool size. The two-
party scheme achieves 100°0 1-hop connectivity in this case, which is definitely higher 
than the FPP-complementary scheme. Besides, the two-party scheme is more flexible 
than the FPP-based symmetric scheme or the FPP-complementary scheme, since we 
can adjust the overlapping factor p to meet the performance requirements of different 
applications. 
Figure 4.2 shows the resilience against node capture for different key pool sizes in 
the same setting that we have described. We assume 50 nodes are captured. 
Figure 4.3 compares the resilience of node capture of different schemes with different 
number of nodes being captured. We assume that the key pool size is P = 9203 (for the 
two-party scheme, p = 0.2). 
As showed in the graph, resilience of the FPP-random scheme is a little worse than 
that of the FPP-based two-party scheme. This is because that, for the FPP-random 
scheme, some keys are more likely to be in the key rings since the core design only uses 
part of the whole key pool. Also, the resilience of the random scheme is a little better 
than that of the FPP-based two-party scheme as showed in the graph. However, in this 
case, the 1-hop key connectivity of the random scheme is much worse than that of the 
FPP-based two-party scheme. As we have discussed in 4.3.1.2, with the same desired 
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node capture than both the FPP-random scheme and the random scheme. Therefore, 
it is obvious that the FPP-based two-party scheme performs better than the random 
scheme. Compared to the FPP-random scheme, the FPP-based two-party scheme also 
has better resilience and better key connectivity. Therefore comes the conclusion that 
the FPP-based two party scheme has the best performance among the three schemes. 
Figure 4.4 shows the result of experiment IV. For our the FPP-based two-party 
scheme, as the network size increases to 10,000, the minimum key ring size reaches 72, 
which is less than two times the key ring size when the network size is 2,000. Meanwhile, 
the 1-hop connectivity maintains the same. Therefore, our two-party scheme is scalable. 
Figure 4.5 represents the influence of different network sizes on the key connectivity 
of the three schemes we have discussed. With the same key ring size K = 72 and same 
key pool size P = 9203, the 1-hop key connectivity of the FPP-based two-party scheme 
is almost the same for networks of different sizes. However, for the FPP-random scheme, 
as illustrated in the graph, it achieves 100°~o key connectivity with small networks and the 
connectivity reduces as the number of nodes increases. This is because when the network 
is small, most nodes pick their key rings from the base design which guarantees 100°0 
1-hop key connectivity. However, the resilience of node capture is higher for networks 
with less nodes, as represented in figure 4.6. 
The resilience against node capture of the three schemes is given in figure 4.6. As the 
number of nodes increases, the resilience of the random scheme becomes worse while the 
resilience of the FPP-random scheme improves a little. However, the FPP-based two-
party scheme maintains the same resilience against node capture for different network 
sizes. 
As we can see from the result, for certain network size, larger key ring size does not 
bring much benefit for the performance of the FPP-based two-party scheme. However, 
larger key ring size improves the 1-hop connectivity of the FPP-random scheme while 
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based two-party scheme, we should always use the minimum key ring size for a certain 
network size. For the FPP-random scheme, we may decide what key ring size to use 
based on different applications. 
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we have discussed five different key pre-distribution schemes for wire-
less sensor network, which fall into three categories: probabilistic scheme, deterministic 
scheme, and hybrid scheme. The first three schemes are proposed by different researchers 
in the past several years, including the random scheme [Eschenauer and Gligor (2002)], 
the FPP-based symmetric scheme [Camtepe and Yener (2004); Lee and Stinson (2005)], 
and the FPP-complementary scheme [Camtepe and Yener (2004)]. The random scheme 
is a probabilistic approach. It is simple and easy to implement while suffers from the 
low key connectivity problem. To improve the key connectivity, researches proposed the 
deterministic FPP-based symmetric scheme using finite projective plane. This scheme 
achieves perfect key connectivity(100°~0). But it has some problems with scalability and 
resilience against node capture. A hybrid FPP-complementary scheme was proposed 
in [Camtepe and Yener (2004)] to improve the performance of the FPP-based symmet-
ric scheme. However, the resilience against node capture in this scheme is not very 
satisfactory. Therefore, we have proposed two novel key pre-distribution schemes in this 
paper. Our goal is to solve the scalability problem of the FPP-based symmetric scheme 
while improve the key connectivity and maintain a good resilience against node capture. 
The FPP-random scheme is a combination of the symmetric scheme and the random 
scheme. The core design of the FPP-random scheme is a finite projective plane that 
can support some of the nodes in the sensor network. Other nodes will pick their key 
rings using the method in the random scheme. With a given key ring size, the FPP-
random scheme can support a network of any size. Therefore, it successfully solve the 
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scalability problem of the FPP-based symmetric scheme. Besides, since the key pool 
size in this scheme is adjustable, it is more flexible and achieves better resilience against 
node capture than the FPP-based complementary scheme. However, when the network 
size is large and the key ring size is small, this scheme performs more like the random 
scheme and the key connectivity is not very good. The FPP-based two-party scheme 
uses two finite projective planes instead only one as in the FPP-based symmetric scheme. 
Therefore, compared to the FPP-based symmetric scheme, our two-party scheme can 
support more sensor nodes and achieves better scalability. Although the key connectivity 
of our scheme is not as good as the FPP-based symmetric scheme, it outperforms the 
other four schemes. Especially when the overlapping factor is 1, the two-party scheme 
achieves 100°~o key connectivity. Besides, the resilience against node capture of the two-
party scheme is also better than the FPP-based symmetric, FPP-complementary, and 
FPP-random schemes. 
Future work can be pursued to further improve the FPP-based two-party scheme. 
For example, more finite projective planes can be added to achieve better scalability 
and resilience against node capture. However, add more finite projective planes will 
decrease the key connectivity of the network. More detailed analysis is required to find 
an optimized solution. Besides, for all the five schemes, resilience against node capture 
is not very good when large number of nodes are captured. More future research need to 
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